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Hamoodur
Rahman Commission Report
Chapter
5
Recommendations
In the concluding
portion of our Main Report, submitted in 1972, we had made a number of
recommendations based on our study of the various aspects of the causes of the
debacle of 1971. Some of these recommendations need to be modified, or
amplified, in the light of the fresh evidence which we have now recorded; while
the need for the others has only been further emphasised. We believe that
the object of setting up this Commission would be fully realised only of
appropriate and early action is taken by the Government on these
recommendation.
2. Even though it
involves a repetition of what we have already said in the Main Report, we
consider that it would be appropriate if all our recommendations are now finally
set out at one place, for facility of reference and action. Detailed
reasons and justification for these recommendations will be found in the
relevant Chapters of the Main Report as well as this Supplementary Report.
We are aware that some of these recommendations have already been implemented,
but this would not appear to be a reason for not including them in this final
summing up.
Trials
3. There is consensus
on the imperative need of bringing to book those senior Army Commanders who have
brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their subversion of the Constitution,
usurpation of political power by criminal conspiracy, their professional
incompetence, culpable negligence and wilful neglect in the performance of their
duties and physical and moral cowardice in abandoning the fight when they had
the capability and resources to resist the enemy. Firm and proper action
would not only satisfy the nation's demand for punishment where it is deserved,
but would also ensure against any future recurrence of the kind of shameful
conduct displayed during the 1971 war. We accordingly recommend that the
following trials be undertaken without delay. :
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(i) That General Yahya
Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt. Gen. S.G.M.M. Pirzada, Lt. Gen. Gul Hasan,
Maj. Gen. Umar and Maj. Gen. Mitha should be publicly tried for being party to a
criminal conspiracy to illegally usurp power from F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan in
power if necessary by the use of force. In furtherance of their common
purpose they did actually try to influence political parties by threats,
inducements and even bribes to support their designs both for bringing about a
particular kind of result during the elections of 1970, and later persuading
some of the political parties and the elected members of the National Assembly
to refuse to attend the session of the National Assembly scheduled to be held at
Dacca on the 3rd of March, 1971. They, furthermore, in agreement with each
other brought about a situation in East Pakistan which led to a civil
disobedience movement, armed revolt by the Awami League and subsequently tot he
surrender of our troops in East Pakistan and the dismemberment of
Pakistan:
(ii) That the Officers
mentioned in No. (i) above should also be tried for criminal neglect of duty in
the conduct of war both in East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The details of
this neglect would be found in the Chapters dealing with the military aspect of
the war
(iii) That Lt. Gen.
Irshad Ahmad Khan, former Commander 1 Corps, be tried for criminal and wilful
neglect of duty in conducting the operations of his Corps in such a manner that
nearly 500 villages of the Shakargarh tehsil of Sialkot district in West
Pakistan were surrendered to the enemy without a fight and as a consequence the
Army offensive in the south was seriously jeopardised;
(iv) That Maj. Gen. Abid Zahid, former GOC 15 Div,
be tried for wilful neglect of duty and shameful surrender of a large area
comprising nearly 98 villages in the Phuklian salient in the Sialkot district of
West Pakistan, which surrender also posed a standing threat to the safety of
Marala Headworks by bringing the Indian forces within nearly 1500 yards
thereof. He also kept the GHQ in the dark about Indian occupation of the
Phuklian salient until the loss was discovered after the
war.
(v) That Maj. Gen B.M. Mustafa, former GOC 18
Division, be tried for wilful neglect of duty in that his offensive plan aimed
at the capture of the Indian position of Ramgarh in the Rajasthan area (Western
Front) was militarily unsound and haphazardly planned, and its execution
resulted in severe loss of vehicles and equipment in the
desert.
(vi) That Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi,
former Commander, Eastern Command, be court-martialled on 15 charges as set out
in Chapter III of part V of the Supplementary Report regarding his wilful
neglect in the performance of his professional and military duties connected
with the defence of East Pakistan and the shameful surrender of his forces tot
he Indians at a juncture when he still had the capability and resources to offer
resistance.
(vii) That Maj. Gen. Mohammad
Jamshed, former GOC 36 (ad-hoc) Division, Dacca, be tried by court martial on
five charges listed against him, in the aforementioned part of the Supplementary
Report, for wilful neglect of his duty in the preparation of plans for the
defence of Dacca and showing complete lack of courage and will to fight, in
acquiescing in the decision of the Commander, Eastern Command, to surrender to
the Indian forces when it was still possible to put up resistance for a period
of two weeks or so, and also for willfully neglecting to inform the authorities
concerned, on repatriation to Pakistan, about the fact of distribution of Rs.
50,000 by him out of Pakistan currency notes and other funds at his disposal or
under his control in East Pakistan.
(viii) That Maj. Gen.
M. Rahim Khan, former GOC 39 (ad-hoc) Division, Chandpur, in East Pakistan, be
tried by court martial on five charges listed against him in this Report for
showing undue regard for his personal safety in abandoning his Division, his
Divisional troops and area of responsibility and vacating his Divisional
Headquarters from Chandpur on the 8th of December, 1971; for his wilful
insistence on moving by day owing to fear of Mukti Bahini and thus causing the
death of fourteen Naval ratings and four Officers of his own HQ, besides
injuries to himself and several others, due to strafing by Indian aircraft; for
his abandoning valuable signal equipment at Chandpur; for spreading despondency
and alarm by certain conversation on the 12th of December, 1971, at Dacca; and
for willfully avoiding submitting a debriefing report to GHQ on being specially
evacuated to West Pakistan in early 1971 so as to conceal the circumstances of
his desertion from him Divisional Headquarters at
Chandpur.
(ix) That Brig. G.M. Baquir
Siddiqui, former GOS, Eastern Command, Dacca, be tried by court martial on nine
charges as formulated in this Report, for his wilful neglect of duty in advising
the Commander, Eastern Command, as regards the concept and formulation of
defence plans, appreciation of the Indian threat, execution of denial plans,
abrupt changes in command, friendliness with he Indian during captivity and
attempts to influence formation Commanders by threats and inducements to present
a coordinated story before the GHQ and the Commission of Inquiry in regard to
the events leading to surrender in East Pakistan.
(x) That Brig Mohammad Hayat, former Commander 107
Brigade, 9 Division, East Pakistan, be tried by court martial on four charges
for displaying wilful neglect in not formulating a sound plan for the defence of
the fortress of Jessore; for failing to properly plan and command the brigade
counter-attack at Gharibpur (Gauripur?), for shamefully abandoning the fortress
of Jessore and delivering intact to the enemy all supplies and ammunition dumps;
and disobeying the orders of the GOC 9 Division, to withdraw to Magura in the
event of a forced withdrawal from Jessore;
(xi) That Brig
Mohammad Aslam Niazi, former commander 53 Brigade, 39 (ad-hoc) Division, East
Pakistan, be tried by court martial on six charges for displaying culpable lack
of initiative, determination and planning ability in that he failed to occupy
and prepare defences at Mudafarganj as ordered by his GOC on the 4th of
December, 1971; for failing to eject the enemy from
Mudafarganj as ordered on the 6th of December, 1971; for
shamefully abandoning the fortress of Laksham on or about the 9th of December,
1971; for wilful neglect in failing to properly organise exfiltration of his
troops from the fortress of Laksham to Comilla on the 9th of December, 1971,
thus resulting in heavy casualties and capture of several elements of his troops
on the way; for showing callous disregard of military ethics in abandoning at
Laksham 124 sick and wounded with two Medical Officers without informing them
about the proposed vacation of the fortress; and for abandoning intact at
Laksham all heavy weapons, stocks of ammunition and supplies for the use of the
enemy
II. Inquiry and Trials for Alleged
Atrocities
4. That as recommended
in Paragraph 7 of Chapter III of Part V of the Main Report and in Paragraph 39
of Chapter II of Part V of this Supplementary Report, a high-powered Court or
Commission of Inquiry be set up to investigate into persistent allegations of
atrocities said to have been committed by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan
during its operations from March to December, 1971, and to hold trials of those
who indulged in these atrocities, brought a bad name to the Pakistan Army and
alienated the sympathies of the local population by their acts of wanton cruelty
and immorality against our own people. The composition of the Court of Inquiry,
if not its proceedings, should be publicly announced so as to satisfy national
conscience and international opinion. The Commission feels that sufficient
evidence is now available in Pakistan for a fruitful inquiry to be undertaken in
this regard. As the Government of Bangladesh has since been recognised by
Pakistan, it may also be feasible to request the Dacca authorities to forward to
this Court of Inquiry whatever evidence may be available with
them.
III.
Other Inquiries
5 .
(i) That
allegations of personal immorality, drunkenness and indulgence in corrupt
practices against General Yahya Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan and Maj. Gen
Khuda Dad Khan be properly investigated as there is prima facie evidence to show
that their moral degeneration resulted in indecision, cowardice and professional
incompetence. In the light of the result of this inquiry suitable charges
may be added against these Officers, during the trials we have already
recommended earlier. The details of the allegations and the evidence
relating thereto will be found in Chapter I of Part V of the Main
Report.
(ii) That similar allegations of
personal immorality, acquiring a notorious reputation in this behalf at Sialkot,
Lahore and Dacca, and indulgence in the smuggling of Pan from East to West
Pakistan made against Lt. Gen. Niazi should also be inquired into and, if
necessary, made the subject matter of additional charges at the trial earlier
recommended in respect of the performance of his professional duties in East
Pakistan. The details of these allegations and the evidence relating
thereto will be found in Chapter I of Part V of the Main Report and in Chapter I
of part V of this supplementary Report.
(iii) That an inquiry
is also indicated into the disposal of Rs.50, 000 said to have been distributed
by Maj. Gen. Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC 39 (ad-hoc) Division and Director
General, East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces immediately before the surrender on
the 16th of December 1971. Details of this matter including the General's
explanation would be found in paragraphs 21 to 23 of Chapter I of Part V of the
Supplementary Report. We have already recommended that this Officer be
tried by a court martial on several charges including his wilful failure to
disclose any facts at all about his sum Rs.50,000. That charge does not
necessarily imply any dishonest practice on his part. The inquiry now
suggested can form a part of the charges already
recommended.
(iv) That allegations of indulging
in large-scale looting of property in East Pakistan including theft of Rs.1,
35,00,000 from the National Bank Treasury at Siraj Ganj persistently made
against Brig. Jehanazeb Arbab, former Commander 57 Brigade, Lt Col (now Brig)
Muzaffar Ali Zahid, former CO 31 Field Regiment, Lt. Col. Basharat Ahmad, former
CO 18 Punjab, Lt. Col Mohammad Taj, former CO 32 Punjab, Lt Col Mohammad Tufail,
former CO 55 Field Regiment and Major Madad Hussain Shah of 18 Punjab, as set
out in paragraph 24 and 25 of Chapter I of part V of the Supplementary Report,
should be thoroughly inquired into and suitable action taken in the light of the
proved facts.
(v) That an inquiry be held into
the allegation, noticed by us in paragraph 36 of Chapter 1 of Part V of the Main
Report, that while serving in the Martial Law Administration at Multan, Maj.
Gen. Jahanzeb, presumably a Brigadier at that time, demanded a bribe of Rs. One
lac from a PCS Officer posted as Chairman of the Municipal Committee of Multan,
on pain of proceeding against him for corruption under martial Law, as a
consequence of which demand the said PCS Officer is said to have committed
suicide leaving behind a letter saying that although he had made only Rs.15,000
he was being required to pay Rs. one lac to the Martial Law officers. The
allegation was made before the Commission by Brig. Mohammad Abbas Beg (Witness
No.9)
(vi) That in inquiry is also
necessary into the allegation made against Brig. Hayatullah that he entertained
some women in his bunker in the Maqbulpur sector (West Pakistan) on the night of
the 11th or 12th of December, 1971, when Indian shells were falling on his
troops. The allegation was contained in an anonymous letter addressed to
the Commission and supported in evidence before us by the Brigadier Hayatullah's
brigade, Major, namely, Major Munawar Khan (Witness
No.42).
(vii) That it is necessary to
investigate into the allegations, as set out in Paragraphs 9 to 14 of Chapter 1
of Part V of the Main Report, to the effect that senior Army Commanders grossly
abused their official position and powers under the Martial Law to acquire large
allotments of land, and obtained substantial house buildings loans on extremely
generous terms from certain banking institutions with which they deposited large
amounts from departmental funds entrusted to their care. Those found
guilty of corrupt practices should receive the punishment they deserve under the
military law or the ordinary criminal law of the land as the case may
be.
(viii) That a thorough investigation be conducted
into the suspicion created in the mind of the Commission, during the recording
of additional evidence of Officers repatriated form India, that there may be
some complicity or collusion between the Commander, Easter Command (Lt. Gen.
A.A.K. Niazi) and his Chief of Staff (Brig G.M. Baqir Saddiqui) on the one hand
and the Indian authorities on the other in the matter of the failure of the
Pakistan Armed Forces to carry out execution of denial plans immediately before
the surrender in spite of instructions issued in this behalf by GHQ on the 10th
of December, 1971. We have already included relevant charges in this behalf
against these two Officers, but we consider that it would be in the public
interest to depute a specialized agency to probe into the matter further. On the
material available to us we cannot put the matter higher than suspicion, but we
have not been able to find any reasonable, or even plausible explanation for the
orders issued by the Easter Command to stop the execution of denial plans,
particularly in Dacca and Chittagong, thus ensuring the delivery intact to the
Indians of large amounts of war materials and other equipment. Details of
these deliveries will be found in our Chapter VII of Part IV dealing with the
aftermath of surrender.
(ix) That an inquiry be held into
the circumstances under which Commander Gul Zareen of the Pakistan Navy was
carried from Khulna to Singapore on the 7th of December, 1971, by a French ship
called M.V. Fortescue, thus abandoning his duties at PNS Titumir Naval Base,
Khulna. The case of this Officer was dealt with by us in Paragraphs 12 and 13 of
Chapter III of Part V of the Main Report.
IV.
Cases Requiring Departmental
Action
6. While examining the
course of events and the conduct of war in East Pakistan, we formed a poor
opinion about the performance and capabilities of Brig. S.A .Ansari,
ex-Commander 23 Brigade, Brig. Manzoor Ahmad, ex-Commander 57 Brigade, 9
Division, and Brig. Abdul Qadir Khan, ex-Commander 94 brigade, 36 (ad hoc)
Division. We consider that their further retention in service is not in
the public interest and they may accordingly be
retired.
V.
Performance and Conduct of Junior
Officers
7. In the very nature
of things the Commission was not in a position to examine at any length the
conduct and performance of officers below the brigade level, although some case
necessarily came to our notice where the performance of these Officers had a
direct bearing on the fate of important battles or where their conduct
transgressed the norms of discipline. Such cases have been mentioned by us
at their proper place, but by and large cases of junior officers must be dealt
with by the respective service headquarters who have obtained detailed
debriefing reports from all of them and are also in possession of the assessment
of their performance by their immediate
superiors.
VI.
Measures for Moral Reform in the Armed
Forces
8. While dealing at
some length with the moral aspect of the 1971 debacle, in Chapter I of Part V of
the Main Report as well as in the corresponding Chapter of the present
Supplementary Report, we have expressed the opinion that there is indeed
substance in the widespread allegation, rather belief, that due to corruption
arising out of the performance of Martial Law duties, lust for wine and women,
and greed for lands and houses a large number of senior Army Officers,
particularly those occupying the highest positions, had not only lost the will
to fight but also the professional competence necessary for taking the vital and
critical decisions demanded ofthem for the successful prosecution of the war.
Accordingly, we recommend that:
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(i) The Government should call upon all Officers of
the Armed Forces to submit declarations of their assets, both moveable and
immovable, and those acquired in the names of their relations and dependents
during the last ten years (they were exempted from submitting such declarations
during the last two periods of martial Law). If on examination of such
declarations any Officer is found to have acquired assets beyond this known
means, then appropriate action should be taken against
him
(ii) The Armed Services should devise ways and means
to ensure: -
(a) That moral values are not
allowed to be compromised by infamous behaviour particularly at higher
levels;
(b) That moral rectitude is given
due weight along with professional qualities in the matter of promotion to
higher ranks;
(c) That syllabi of academic
studies at the military academics and other Service Institutions should include
courses designed to inculcate in the young minds respect for religious
democratic and political institutions;
(d) That use of
alcoholic drinks should be banned in military messes and
functions
(e) That serious notice should be
taken of notorious sexual behaviour and other corrupt
practices
VII. Discipline and Terms
and Conditions of Service
9. These matters were
discussed by us in Chapter III of Part V of the Main Report, and for the reasons
given therein we make the following recommendations: -
(i) An inter-services study should be undertaken of
the operative terms and conditions of service and amenities available to
Officers, JCOs and other ranks of the Services so as to remove disparities
existing in this behalf and causing discontentment among the junior officers and
other ranks of various Services
(ii) The GHQ should
consider the advisability of adopting recommendations contained in the report
submitted by the Discipline Committee headed by the late Maj. Gen. Iftikhar Khan
Janjua
(iii) The Navy and Air Force might
also appoint their own Discipline Committees to consider the peculiar problems
of their Services, such measure to be in addition to the inter-services study
recommended above.
VIII.
Improvement and Modernization of the Pakistan
Navy
10. From the detailed
discussion of the role of the Navy, as contained in Section (D) of Chapter VIII
of Part IV of the Main Report, and supplemented by further details of its
operations in East Pakistan is set out in this Supplementary Report, it seems to
us that the following steps are urgently called for to improve our naval
capability: -
(i) That immediate attention
should be given to he basic requirements for the modernization of the Pakistan
Navy in order to make it capable of protecting the only sea port of Pakistan and
of keeping the lifelines of the nation open. The Navy has been sadly
neglected ever since the first Martial Law regime, for in the concept of Army
Commander the Navy was not expected to play much of a role. The folly of
this theory was fully demonstrated during this war. The Pakistan Navy, we
strongly recommend, should have its own air arm of suitable aircraft for the
purpose of reconnaissance and for defence against missile boats. This is the
only way in which the threat posed by the growing Indian Navy and her missile
boats can be countered.
(ii) There is urgent need for
developing a separate harbour for the Navy away from Karachi, from where the
Navy can protect the approaches to Karachi more
effectively
(iii) In view of the serious
handicaps which were posed by the late conveyance of the D-day and the H-hour to
the Pakistan Navy and its total exclusion from he planning for war, the need for
making the Navy a fully operative member in he joint Chiefs of Staff
Organization is imperative.
IX.
Improvement in the Role of P.A.F.
11. In Section (C) of
Chapter VIII of Part IV of the Main Report as well as in a separate Chapter of
the present supplement (viz Chapter X of Part III), we have discussed at length
the role and performance of the P.A.F. in the 1971 war. In the light of
that discussion, we recommend as follows: -
(i) We are not convinced that a more forward-looking
posture cannot be adopted by eh Air Force having regard to the peculiar needs of
the country. We recommend, therefore, that Pakistan should have more
forward air fields located at such places from where it might be in a position
to give more protection to our vital line of communication as well as to major
centres of industry. The adoption of such a forward strategy would also
increase the striking capabilities of our fighters.
(ii) There is need also to improve the working of
our early warning system. The time lag between the observation of an enemy
aircraft by the first line of Mobile Observer Units and the final collation of
that information in the Air Operation Centre takes unduly long because of the
draftory system of reporting adopted. Training exercises to coordinate the
working of the various agencies employed for the operation of the early warning
system should be held periodically to keep them at a high pitch of
efficiency.
(iii) The Karachi Port should also
be provided as soon as possible, with a low level seaward-looking radar which it
seriously lacks and due to the want of which it suffered many handicaps during
the last war.
(iv) That with the increased
Indian capability of blockading Karachi with missile boats the air defence of
Karachi should be attached greater importance. Leaving the defence of
Karachi to be tackled only by one squadron of fighters and a half squadron of
bombers was extremely unwise.
X.
Re-organization of Air Defence of
Pakistan
12. The subject of air
defence has been discussed by us at some length in section (13) of Chapter VIII
of Part IV of the Main Report. In the light of that discussion, we make
the following recommendations: -
(a) Since it will not
be possible for us to enlarge our Air Force to any appreciable extent in the
near future, we strongly recommend that we should strengthen our air defence
programmes by at least doubling our holdings of anti-craft guns by the end of
1972 and ultimately raising it under a phased programme to 342 Batteries as
suggested by the Air Force.
(b) Efforts should
also be made to procure ground to air missiles for a more effective air defence
of the country.
(c) If ground-to-air missiles are
not available, then efforts should also be made to get radar controlled medium
HAA guns from China.
XI.
Recommendations with Regard to Civil Defence
Measures
13. This subject has
also examined by us in Chapter VIII of Part IV of the Main Report, and we
consider that the following measures are called for to improve the civil defence
aspects in Pakistan: -
(a) The civil defence arrangements
should be placed under the Ministry of Defence, and not be made the
responsibility of the Ministry of Interior or other individual
departments. The Central Government should accept the responsibility for
the overall control and organization of the civil defence of the country, as
Provincial Governments have not been able to shoulder this responsibility
effectively in the past.
(b) Steps should be taken to
improve the fire-fighting facilities in the country, particularly in ports and
industrial areas.
(c) Industrialists keeping
inflammable materials near lines of communications and other vulnerable points
should be induce, or in fact obliged under the law, to accept responsibility for
the protection of their materials, and make effective arrangements for
fire-fighting in their establishments.
(d) Provision should
be made for storing large quantitative of petrol and other fuels
underground.
XII.
Higher Direction of War
14. The deficiencies
in the organization for the higher direction of war were examined by us in
Chapter XI of Part IV of the Main Report, and in the light of that discussion,
we proposed the following measures: -
(a) The three Service
Headquarters should be located at one place along with the Ministry of Defence.
(b) The posts of
Commander-in-Chiefs should be replaced by Chiefs of Staff of the respective
services (This, we understand, has already been done by the
Government)
(c) The Defence Committee of the
Cabinet should be re-activated and it should be ensured that its meetings are
held regularly. A positive direction should be added in its Charter to
give the Cabinet Division the right to initiate proceedings for the convening of
its meetings should be held even in the absence of the President or the Prime
Minister under the Chairmanship of the senior most minister
present.
(d) There should also
be a Defence Ministers Committee and the Ministry of Defence should assume its
rightful position as a policy-making body and incorporating policy, decisions
into defence programmes after consultations with the three services. This
should ensure the preparations of realistic plans for the national defence with
in the agreed framework of (illegible) allocations. It should meet under
the chairmanship of the Defence Minister and comprise the Defence Secretary, the
three service chiefs, the financial adviser for defence, the Director General of
Civil Defence, the Director General of munitions production, the Director
General of Defence Procurement, the Director General of inter-services
Intelligence Directorate, the Defence Scientific Adviser and any other Central
Secretary or Service officer who may be required for a particular item on
agenda. If the defence portfolio is held by the President or the Prime
Minister then its meeting may be presided over by a Deputy Minister for or by
the Minister in charge of Defence Production (illegible) Minister is available,
the Defence Secretary should preside, irrespective of any considerations of
protocol or (illegible)
(e) The Secretaries
Coordination Committee as at present constituted, should
continue
(f) (illegible) The three services
should share (illegible) joint responsibility for national defence and that all
plans and programmes for the development of the (illegible) forces should be
based on joint (illegible) objectives, it is necessary. Therefore, that
the three services Chief should (illegible) As Joint Chiefs of Staff and not
merely as individual Heads of their respective Services. This Joint Chiefs
or Staff should constitute a corporate body with collective responsibility
having its own (illegible) staff for evolving joint plans and its own
Headquarters located on one place. The (illegible) of chairman of this
Joint Chiefs of Staff must be held by rotation, irrespective of the personal
ranks enjoyed by the three service chiefs. The duration of the tenure
should be one year at a time and the chairmanship should commence with the
(illegible) Service, mainly, the Army. A detailed Chapter of duties for
this Joint Chiefs of Staff has been suggested in Annexure 'I' of Chapter XI of
Part IV of the Main report.
(g) Under the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Organisation there will not only by a Secretariat but also a
joint planning staff drawn from all the three Services. It might be
designed as the Joint Secretariat and Planning Staff. It will be
responsible not only for providing the necessary secretarial assistance
(illegible) Also for evolving the joint defence plans and (illegible) studies of
processing of all matters inter-(illegible) The Joint Chief of Staff may
also have other Joint Common to assist them on such matters, as it may consider
necessary.
(h) The weakness, in the
(illegible) of the armed forces, which have been brought by light, (illegible)
feel that there is need for an institution like the America (illegible) General
which should be a body changed was the duty of carrying out surprise inspection
and calling area the formations and (illegible) concerned to demonstrate that
the (illegible) (this paragraph not readable)
(i) We have also felt the (illegible) for in
Institute of Strategic Studies, preferably as a part of a University
Programme. The need for such an (illegible) has been highlighted by the
weakness in our joint strategic panning by the three Services. We are of
the opinion that such an Institute will go a long way in producing studies of
value for examination by the other defence
organizations.
XIII National Security Council
15. Having
examined the working of the National Security Council in Chapter XI of Part IV
of the Main Report we are of the opinion that there is no need for
super-(illegible) such an organization on the Directorate of Intelligence Bureau
and the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence. The Security Council should
therefore be abolished.
XIV.
The Farman Ali
incident
16. In view of the
fresh evidence examined by us regarding the role of Maj. Gen. Farman Ali, which
we have discussed in the concluding portion of Chapter III of Part V of the
Supplementary Report, recommendation No. 7 made in the Main Report has now
become (illegible); as we have found that in delivering a message to Mr. Paul
Mare Henry, Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations. Maj. Gen. Farman
Ali, acted under the instructions of the Governor of East Pakistan, who in turn
had been authorised by the then President of Pakistan to make certain proposals
for settlement in East Pakistan at the critical
juncture.
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